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Preface: A War of Words
Imagine a Roman citizen of the 50s BCE unrolling Caesar’s Commentarii de Bello
Gallico. They might expect a dramatic tale of barbarians rushing naked against Roman shields
with faces painted blue, blonde mustaches adorning their faces, their hair like horses’ manes
flowing in the wind. Our Roman would probably believe Gallic society to be even more
mysterious than their battle tactics; after all, they counsel with druids, they count by nights, and
they believe in a never-ending cycle of life and death. Although some Romans possibly read
Posidonius’ account of Gallic society (which dispels some of these prejudices), most would think
of them as the barbaric enemy to the North. After all, these were the descendants of the Gauls
that sacked Rome in 390 BCE.1
At distinct points in the narrative, this is what Caesar wants you and I, or rather his
Roman audience, to believe is the reality of Gaul. However, it is a purposeful exaggeration of the
truth, an invented Gaul created by a man writing an account of his own achievements. As Shadee
writes, concerning the ethnography of the BG,
Caesar's organizing hand is more readily recognized in his portrayal of the protagonists of
De Bello Gallico and their actions, than in the geographical setting in which they operate.
Moreover, Caesar's characterizations of northern Europe appear acceptable because they
agree, to some extent, with our own conceptions of Europe. The reason for this
correspondence is, of course, that Caesar's conquests and their presentation formed an
inspiration for many classical, early modern and modern historians and statesmen, on
whose visions our notions are in part dependent. Yet Caesar's ethnographies are not
intended as straightforward observations of reality 2

1

Made famous by Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita 5.41, although the work comes after the BG, we can
assume that this was the depiction of the sack of Rome common in the 1st Century BCE.
2

Shadee (2008) 158-160.
3

Working off of Shadee’s concept that Caesar’s ethnography is unique due to how he represents
the Gauls and Germans based of their actions, the aim of this thesis is to investigate particular
ethnographic exaggerations such as clientela and to explore how they underscore the political
purposes of the BG. I will also draw upon Shadee’s ideas on Caesar’s organizing hand,
particularly the interplay between Caesar’s textual aims within the work and political aspirations
for the military conquest, as I find this defines Caesar's unique ethnographic stylings. For the
majority of books, I-V, Caesar presents incidental ethnographic features of Gallic society such as
patron/client relationships and their tendency to rely on rumor, which can be found in the
military campaign. My own reading of Caesar’s ethnography was inspired by this inter-play
between the ethnographic “digression” in book VI and the scattered ethnographic details of the
military narrative.
For instance, Caesar opens his account with the campaign against the Helvetii and it is
told with quasi-journalistic clarity. Divicicus the Aeduian druid tells Caesar of the Helvetian
“problem” and asks for Roman aid. Caesar subsequently marches to Gaul in defense of an
amicus Romani.3 As Caesar tells us, in 60 BCE, an ambitious young Gallic aristocrat named
Orgetorix had made a move for power and attempted to become the king of one of the most
powerful tribes in Gaul: the Helvetii.4 He gained prominence among the tribe, displaying
qualities such as bravery, wealth, and a familial connection to former powerful Helvetian
warlords.5 With a silver tongue, he convinced the Helvetians to fulfill his desires of expansion

3

BG 1.3.
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BG 1.2. (trans. Raaflaub)

5

Such characteristics are certainly not foreign to Roman politicians on the make and certain novi
homines.
4

and told them they must forsake their homes to make a campaign for the conquest of new lands.
Orgetorix and his Helvetian supporters took two years to prepare for the expedition. In addition,
Orgetorix conspired with Casticus of the Sequani and Dumnorix of the Aedui to take up the
crowns of their own people and join the Helvetian cause.6
Orgetorix’s plot to seize the crown is discovered and he stands trial for conspiring to
assume ultimate power, a heinous crime that was punishable by a fiery death in the heart of the
Wicker Man. To escape from his execution, he gathered his “clients and persons indebted to
him” and flees to the Gallic countryside7. On the lam, he died by his own hand.8 Leaderless, the
Helvetii nonetheless make their final preparations and go on the march, their ancestral homeland
ablaze behind them. One might think without a leader that they would not take on such a
grueling mission. The fact that they went on campaign in spite of Orgetorix’s death indicates that
it was not the policy, but rather the leader that was problematic.
The Helvetii march through the lands of the Aedui and their neighbors. They plunder
towns and cut down fields for supplies. Caesar, protector of Rome and, more importantly, patron
of the Aedui, meets the Helvetii in a vulnerable position: three-fourths of their forces had already
crossed the Arar River and one-fourth is left on the same bank as the Roman forces.9 He shows
no remorse in his slaughter of the unprepared force, finally taking revenge on the Tigurini for

6

BG 1.3.1-1.3.8 (trans. Raaflaub).
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BG 1.4.2 (trans. Raaflaub).

8

BG 1.4.4 (trans. Raaflaub); Caesar says likely by suicide, although he is not entirely certain.

9

BG 1.8.1 to 1.8.4 (trans. Raaflaub), Caesar and Divicicus’ patron/client relationship is
paramount for Caesar justifying entering the Gallic political landscape.
5

their slaughter of Lucius Cassius' army in 107 BCE. 10 Caesar’s men then construct a massive
bridge over the Arar in a single day to face the rest of the Helvetian forces.11 The stunned
Helvetians clash with the Roman war machine. Caesar unapologetically denies the Gauls at
every turn. His literary goal is to show the full might of the Senate and People of Rome. He
glorifies his men’s tactical ability to defeat their enemy, erect massive structures such as bridges
and walls strong enough to repel tens of thousands of Gallic combatants in hours, and travel at
unbelievable speeds.12
Sensing an opportunity to take tactical advantage over the Helvetii, Caesar orders his
troops to meet them in battle. Before reaching the town of Bibracte, the Helvetii march uphill to
attack Caesar’s forces.13 Caesar and his men, with the advantage of higher ground, hurl their
spears and repel brutish force with Roman shields. The battered Helvetii march to a smaller hill
southwest of the original battlefield. The Romans fight uphill to meet the Helvetian forces to
deliver the final blow. Although they find themselves outflanked, Caesar commands his men to
fight their way out to the Helvetian baggage fort and they lay waste to it. When the fog of war is

10

BG 1.12.3-7 (trans. Raaflaub); Caesar points to divine intervention as a reason why the
Tigurini were the first of the Helvetii to be killed, according to Raaflaub, “Caesar rarely
mentions the god’s impact on war and prefers to consider that of chance and luck (Fortuna).”
Perhaps this is Caesar showing the impact of the first battle being both so successful and
vengeful.
11

See Raaflaub’s (2019) annotation at 1.13a-b concerning the construction aspect of the Roman
military and the trope of superiority through technological advantage.
12

Literally and figuratively, an interesting addition to the exaggerations of the BG could be to
question the speed at which Caesar travels. Using Orbis, a geospatial network model of the
Roman world created by Stanford University, the reality of Caesar’s travel could easily be tested.
This is also a trope that appears elsewhere in military accounts of Caesar such as his action
towards the pirates that kidnapped him, see Osgood (2010) pg. 328-358.
13

BG 1.23.2 (trans. Raaflaub).
6

lifted, Caesar takes a census of the remaining Helvetii. Of the 368,000 who left their ancestral
homeland, only 110,000 remain. 220,000 people did not survive the onslaught. The 6,000 Gauls
who escape the ruins of the baggage fort all are sold into slavery.14
What follows in the narrative of de Bello Gallico is eerily reminiscent of this initial
Helvetian campaign. Caesar outmaneuvers and outclasses his opponents from books I to VI with
Roman coolness and tactical precision. However, the campaign against the Helvetii is by far the
most brutal and unforgiving towards the Gallic inhabitants. Caesar paints a picture of a smaller
force of “pacifying Romans” absolutely decimating a larger force of “vicious Barbarians.” In this
trope, the latter is powerless against the tactics, technology, and leadership of Caesar and his
army. Caesar does this almost sympathetically for his reader. His depictions of the battles are
blunt and calculated, so rather than being bogged down by the morality of the killing, the reader
is amazed by the number of “pacified” Helvetii and Caesar’s particular bellum Romanum.15
Caesar the author was able to control the entire narrative and he configures his narrative in order
to please his reader’s sensibilities and gain their support.16

14

BG 1.30.3 (trans. Raaflaub).

15

As James J. O’Donnell points out, the Latin word for blood (sanguis) is only mentioned twice
in the entire 8-year campaign. BG 7.20.12.2 & 7.50.6.3
16

This is particularly true of the BG as a military narrative. Caesar’s reader is spared the
thought of Roman family members or friends or agents of the Republic committing a mass
genocide, and can focus on Caesar’s day to day conquering. This is particularly interesting if we
look at Korneel (2013), who discusses attitudes towards what we now understand to be PostTraumatic Stress brought on by military service in Republican Rome. He shows that there is a
distinction in interest between military violence and the spectacle of public violence such as
executions and gladiatorial combat. I would suggest that Caesar engages with the actuality of
violence in a sympathetic manner to appeal to an audience who understood such violence in their
daily lives. His readers were possibly veterans who knew the violence of war or everyday
Romans who would rather hear about battles won than hearing of their family members and
friends brutally slaughtering Gallic men, women, and children. He was conscious of this and it
reflects in his writing style and rhetorical technique.
7

Throughout the work, Caesar combines the day to day military movements of the war
with glimpses of ethnography. Ethnographic details culminate in the long excursus of book VI,
which is the primary subject of this thesis. Not only does this pause the account in a notable
manner, but the narrative drastically changes after the excursus. In books I-VI, Caesar is
outnumbered and fights on foreign soil, yet he defeats the Gauls with wit, technology, and
maneuverability. By book VII, the Gauls under Vercingetorix fight with Roman discipline and
show technological advancements that rival those of Rome. Societally, the people against whom
he fights in books I-V are distinctly barbarian with some important exceptions, yet in books VI
and VII Caesar emphasizes strong Roman features in their socio-political hierarchies.
There is a subtle, yet clear shift in how “Roman” the Gauls become during the eight-year
campaign. This shift is most noticeable after the excursus. In books I-V, the Caesarian reader is
made to believe Gaul is plunged deep into barbarity, but after book VI, the Gallic people are
shown to have the ability to serve Rome and its people, as they are more akin to Romans than
first thought. The ways in which Caesar crafted the Gallic socio-political landscape through his
ethnography to both Romanize and Barbarianize the Gauls led me to explore the reasons Caesar
created this particular landscape in De Bello Gallico.

8

Section I: Introduction and Methodologies
Recent scholarship, often employing a post-colonialism or historical revisionist lens, has
challenged the veracity of Caesar’s claims and explored his reasons for characterizing the Gauls
in the manner he does. I enter this conversation at a point where we understand the
purposefulness and literary artistry of Caesar’s writing. Scholars today are very aware that the
BG is not an unbiased account of his war in Gaul. I will explore the political purposes of
Caesar’s text and the ways the ethnographic material helps to justify his conquest of Gaul.
Concerning the distribution of the BG, there are two schools of thought within the scholastic
zeitgeist. The first school of thought is that Caesar sent the chapters as annual reports. In this
theory, Caesar would write the reports throughout the campaign, and send it back to Rome
during the winter. The second school suggests that Caesar crafted the BG during the 7th year of
the war in 51BCE and distributed the work before his return to Rome, famously crossing the
Rubicon on January 10th, 49 BCE. The idea that Caesar wrote the BG during the hardship of the
7th year is made famous by Matthias Gelzer in his 1968 biography on Caesar. Gelzer argues that
the BG was meant to turn the tide against Caesar’s opposition in the Senate.17 However, recent
scholars of the BG have argued that the work must have been published in annual reports. For
this view, I turn to the scholarship of T.P. Wiseman and his article “The Publication of De Bello
Gallico.”
Concerning Gelzer’s theories on the publication and distribution of the BG, Wiseman
writes:
Two assumptions are being taken for granted here. First, that De Bello Gallico is a single
narrative composed as a unit after the defeat of Vercingetorix; second, that it was aimed
17

Gelzer (1968) 171.
9

at an elite audience of senators and equites, and based on earlier reports to the
senate…Both assumptions, it seems to me, are demonstrably false.
In his textual analysis, Wiseman first argues that the BG must have been released as annual
reports, citing particularly the population of the Nervii in Books II and V.18 Having solidified his
thoughts on the publication of the work, Wiseman then defines the Caesar’s audience. It must be
acknowledged that the literate population of Rome during the late Republic was minuscule,
consisting of a small population of literati elite.19 However, Caesar’s praise of the common man
such as Lucius Vorenus and Titus Pullo and particularly the 10th Legion’s bravery in the face of
the Germans and Britains shows his praise of the common man.20 As Wiseman points out,
Caesar was a popularis. His political base was made up of the common man, and this is show in
his somewhat over use of the phrase populus Romanus.21 So, how did Caesar reach an illiterate
audience with the BG? Wiseman suggests that the work would have been read aloud, following
the tradition of historians such as Thucydides before him.22
Knowing the manner of publication and Caesar’s audience allows us to define the Caesarian
reader. As I have discussed earlier, Caesar’s work is unique due to how he crafted it
sympathetically to his reader. The BG is an intentional work, and defining the Caesarian reader
as such a diverse audience allows us to know how it was written and why. For example, it must
be acknowledged that the Gallic resistance of Book VI, led by Vercingetorix was the most

18

Wiseman (1998) 2, BG 2.15-2.32 & BG 5.36-5.58.

19

Wiseman (1998) 2.

20

Wiseman (1998) 3-4.

21

41 times in Book I alone.

22

Wiseman (1998) pg. 3-7
10

difficult campaign for Caesar. Book VII is the only account in which the Romans lose a battle
with Caesar at their helm, and the battle of Alesia represents the grueling challenge of defeating
a calculated, well-led, and well-armed Gallic force. It is interesting how Caesar introduces this
resistance in line 7.1, he writes:
Gaul was quiet. Caesar proceeded to Italy, as planned, to hear cases. There he learns of
Clodius’ murder and hears of the senates’ decree that the youth of Italy should take the
oath; he decides to hold a draft across the whole province. This news passes swiftly to
Transalpine Gaul. Gauls add to it and make up stories as opportunity suggest, that Caesar
is detained by unrest at Rome and cannot rejoin the Army while such disturbances last.
Seizing this opportunity, people already unhappy to be subject to the Roman people’s
rule, begin openly, daringly to make plans for war. Gallic leaders summon meetings in
woods and wild places, complaining about the death of Acco and observing that the same
could happen to them. They bemoan the common lot of Gaul. With every promise and
bribe, they challenge men to begin war and liberate Gaul, risking their necks.23
This line suggests that not only do the Romans have access to the happenings of Gaul, but the
Gauls have an ear to the political world of Rome, and decide to go to war with Caesar because of
his apparent weakness. What happened in the political worlds of Rome and Gaul were
intertwined through the BG, and with his work, Caesar was able to control the narrative to both
his opposition and his allies. Throughout this essay, it important to keep the Caesarian reader in
mind, as their sensibilities and actions are behind Caesar’s portrayal of the campaign’s
interworkings.
Scholars such as Andrew Riggsby and Andrew C. Johnston have analyzed how Caesar
“others” the Gauls in his depiction of Gallic and Germanic societies.24 A post-colonial viewpoint
allows the Caesarian reader to further understand Roman ideals through descriptions of the lands

23

BG 7.1 (trans Raaflaub).

24

For example, Riggsby (2006) uses postcolonial theory to delve into the language and rhetoric
of de Bello Gallico to understand the Roman identity that Caesar poses to his reader as well as
Caesar’s political motivations for creating a Caesarian-Roman mystique. Spurr (1993).
11

and people which they conquered.25 Caesar's semi-Romanization of the Gauls delineates the
contrasts between Roman, Gallic, and Germanic values and helps us understand how the BG
sheds light on both other cultures and his own. Building off of the scholarship of Riggsby and
Johnston, I am concerned with how Caesar’s othering interacts with the deliberate writing of the
work. Caesar’s use of othering creates a virtual “scale of civilization” between the three groups
(Romans, Gauls, and Germans) by which Caesar categorizes the social development of each
society. In doing so, Caesar substantiates his own colonial rhetoric for his Roman audience; these
motivations are used as justification for his campaign. Therefore, the ethnographic details of the
work were meant to council his Roman audience on the importance of conquering the Gauls,
crossing the Rhine to engage with Germanic forces, and subjugating the majority of TransAlpine Europe.
To define the scale of civilization, I turn to the scholarship of David Spurr and his work
The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial
Administration.26 While discussing the categorization of “less superior societies” Spurr studied
the appearance of two schools of thought, the Charles Darwin and the Joseph-Arthur Comte de
Gobineau schools. Spurr asserts that Darwin in his Journal of Researches (1839) believed in a
structure where the differences of society came from relative human evolution, in which societies

25

Of course, in any colonial rhetoric of othering, the author represents their own society selfreflexively. As represented in Caesarian scholar Johnston (2018) 18-29. For more defining works
on post-colonial theory and its practicality in Classical studies, see Saïd (1978) 1-92, Hall
(1989) 1-55, and Ando (2016) 5-12.
26

Although the book serves the purpose of delving into the colonial rhetoric of 21st century,
particularly within the theaters of Africa and South America, he adds an interesting theory basis
concerning the categorization of civilization that is useful to understanding the Roman rhetoric
of Empire. See Riggsby (2006) 121-126 concerning the usefulness of postcolonial theory and
Caesar.
12

evolve at different paces.27 Therefore, Darwin asserts that it is the job of the colonist (more
advanced society) to push the colonized (less advanced society) into a more evolved state. In
doing so, Darwin asserts his biological theories apply to human societal evolution, in which an
imperial force represents the forces of nature, and the native population represents the organism
in the midst of evolution. Darwin believed technology and social/moral inequalities defined the
difference between societal evolutionary tracks, but argues that growth and evolution are
possible. Gobineau on the other hand, in his Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines (1854),
believes that the differences between races and societies are natural, inherent, and absolutely
unchanging.28 He argues that only societies that are already developed have the ability to
continue to progress and evolve. Gobineau theorizes that in contrast, “uncivilized” counterparts
are unable to match their social “betters,” nor incite their own progression. Therefore, more
developed societies will always be more developed than their “uncivilized” counterparts.
The ability for social evolution is the separating factor between the Darwin and Gobineau
schools. To frame the two theorists in a Roman context, Darwin posits that barbarian societies, in
this case the Gauls, Germans, and Britains could aspire to and attain Roman standards of society.
In contrast, Gobineau represents their inability to ever match a Roman social erudition and
technological sophistication. Although the juxtaposition of two different sociological theories is
not always perfect, there is a strong resemblance between Caesar’s ethnography of the Gauls,
Germans, and Britains and Darwin’s evolutionary ethnocentrism.

27

Darwin suggest that Western societies are the epitome of social evolution.

28

Spurr (1993) 62-66.
13

Throughout the BG, the Caesarian audience, although quite diverse, is meant both to
understand the necessity of his war and to engage in active discussions about its purpose in the
Roman streets and forum. Caesar reflects ideas from the Darwinian school to create a supportive
and sympathetic reader within the ethnography.29 The reciprocal relationship between reader and
author was of the utmost importance. When Caesar sends back his yearly reports he is not only
able to convey the day to day movements of his army and the importance of his conquest, but he
also is able to stay relevant within the larger socio-political sphere of Rome.30 Caesar as writer
was reaching out to an audience of Romans who both supported and opposed his leadership and
political career, and he hoped to continue fostering their support or to sway their opposition. I
argue that Caesar’s rhetoric in the BG pandered to his audience and their sensibilities in order to
garner their support. Caesar wanted his audience to understand that the Gauls of Transalpine
Gaul could be a value to the Roman empire as a province, much like Cisalpine Gaul.31 The
ability to connect with his audience as a whole was invaluable to Caesar, considering support for
his campaign was crucial for his own political career, social standing, and ambitions for Northern
“pacification.”
Caesar’s ethnographic lens was a literary strategy meant to highlight how the Gauls were
similar to the Romans in some cultural and social norms, but “barbarian” in others. Most

29

If the Gauls can become more Roman and aid Rome in the future, they will be sympathetic to
an extensive war that drains money and men from Roman households. If the Gobineau school
was used by Caesar, he would prove the opposite and the cost added from the war would not
have this ‘sympathetic’ function.
30

For a comprehensive argument concerning the nature of the BG and the delivery of the work
to Rome, see Wiseman (1998) pg.1-10.
31

A province in 81 BCE and all members made citizens in 49 BCE.
14

importantly Caesar implies that they had the ability for future social evolution and incorporation
into Roman world. Scholars such as Andrew Johnston and Andrew Riggsby have argued that the
ethnography of book VI paired with the military ethnographies of books I-VII illuminate
Caesar’s purposeful writing style.32 It is my intention to show how Caesar’s writing strategy is
meant to justify conquering Gaul.
There is no way to tell if Caesar is telling the truth in his ethnography. As Riggsby suggests
in his book Caesar in Gaul and Rome, the Greek tradition of Gallic ethnography including
Posidonius, Diodorus Siculus, and Strabo offers a different version of the Gauls. Caesar’s
omissions and exaggerations then must be explained as purposeful. In fact, archeological
evidence and further study of pre-conquest Gaul supports the conclusion that Caesar offers his
own idiosyncratic account of the Gauls. As Johnston explains,
Order is the fundamental theme of the ethnographic excursus in book 6, which is
now acknowledged to bear little resemblance to the realities of Late Iron Age
culture in pre-conquest Gaul; indeed, the rubric of “factuality” has limited
explanatory value for any ancient ethnographic representation. Thus,
disentangled from “the facts,” the digression must be interpreted as thoroughly a
rhetorical construct motivated by Caesar’s textual aims.33
Johnston reminds us that Caesar was not an ethnographer, writing the BG for sociological or
philosophical exploration. Caesar's “textual aims” fit his position as a statesman and a general.
Caesar was not the first ancient author to write about the Gauls, however he was the first military
commander and politician to create his own Gaul, namely a Gaul “disentangled from the facts”
represented in previous ethnographies.

32

Riggsby (2006) 47-59 and Johnston (2018) 81-94.

33

Johnston (2018) 88.
15

One example of this is Caesar’s omission of the Bardic class of Gallic society. While
previous authors stress the four major groups in Gallic society, Caesar points out in 6.13.1-6.15.2
that there are only three groups. The first is the military aristocracy, whose power comes from
their control over their clients to engage in the annual raiding season. The second grouping is the
Druids who are scholars, priests, and purveyors of knowledge in the Gallic society. Druidical
power comes from ancient knowledge. Subsequently young men from the military aristocracy
congregate around Druids for their expertise. The third group is the proletariat Gauls whom
Caesar calls “slaves,” they have neither power nor personal sovereignty.34 Contrary to the Greek
tradition, as seen in Diodorus Siculus and Strabo, Caesar completely omits the class of Bards
who continue the oral traditions of Gallic society.35 Instead Caesar gives this attribute to the
Druids, which seems to be the socio-political class that piqued his interest the most.36
Not only does Caesar purposefully omit certain features of Gallic society that are
represented in the Greek tradition, he exaggerates others purposefully. These exaggerations can
be seen in the scale of civilization, where Caesar also hyperbolizes the Greek tradition of
describing people they believe to be “barbarians.” This is most clearly found within his
exploration of Germanic life. Caesar creates a hard line between the Germans and the Gauls,
which is determined geographically by the Rhine river. He also shows a complete separation
between the barbarity of their societies along with their geographical separation.

34

BG 6.13.

35

Riggsby (2006) 63 discussing Diodorus Siculus 5.31.5 and Strabo 4.4.4

36

I.e. his 12-line description of them, his use of Divicicus as an example of Patron/client
relationships, and his use of the pan-Gallic druid council throughout the work. He also dedicates
BG 6.13-6.15 to the inner workings of their place in Gallic society.
16

In his article “Nostri and the ‘Others’” Andrew Johnston points out Caesar’s “invention
of the Germanic society.”37 In this article, Johnston supports the idea of a scale of civilization in
which Caesar positions Gaul as a mirror for Rome. Using the mirror that is Gaul, Caesar can
point out both the faults of Rome and the strengths of Gaul socio-politically. He argues that
Gauls are on one hand stuck in the tropes of “Northern barbarity” and on the other hand
displayed as affected/socialized by Roman presence. Caesar describes Gaul in terms of how its
society compares and contrasts to Roman society. Germania on the other hand is described “in
terms of lacks and absences.”38 This is just one exaggeration that leads to further questions about
Caesar’s rhetorical tactics.
In contrast to Caesar’s hard line of geographic and ethnographic differences between the
Germanic and Gallic peoples, Greek ethnographers had a hard time creating distinctions between
the two.39 Strabo especially creates a homogeneous “Northern Barbarian” that closely resembles
other Greek ethnographies such as the Scythians and Numidians of Herodotus.40 By recognizing
Caesar’s diversions from Greek historians, geographers, and ethnographers, the Caesarian reader
finds singularities within the larger canon of Gallic ethnography that we can attribute to Caesar
alone.41

37

Johnston (2018) 89-91.

38

Johnston (2018) 91: for example, their lack of property rights, lack of ‘proper gods’, lack of
agriculture, lack of social stratification, and most importantly their lack of druids and sacrifices
which Caesar sees as the most interesting parts of barbaric Gallic society. BG, 6.21-6.23.
39

Krebs (2006) 111-120.

40

Riggsby (2006) 55-56.

41

The main argument of Riggsby (2006) 47-53; the ethnography is uniquely Caesarian compared
to the Greek ethnography.
17

I intend to use the ethnographic details that are uniquely Caesarian to show how Caesar
“invented” a Gaul that fit his position as a conqueror and an author. In Caesar’s broad stroke
ethnography of Book VI, it is clear that he is reaching out to his Roman audience for a multitude
of potential reasons. Due to the nature of Caesar being both conqueror and author, he able to
simultaneously justify the expansion of his wealth, stretch the reach of the Empire, and advertise
his adventurous spirit.42 The social norms that Caesar fabricates make the Caesarian ethnography
unique to the BG and his account of Gallic society. After a close reading of the ethnographic
material in book VI, I will focus on one aspect of it, clientela, and reveal its importance for the
larger narrative.
Caesar clearly exaggerates the social function of clientela among the Gauls, which is first
described in Posidonius. Posidonius describes the “parasites” that eat around the military gentry,
but this relationship is concerned with nothing more than dining traditions.43 Caesar on the other
hand uses clientela as the central piece for his ethnographic purposes because of the prevalence
of patrons and clients in Rome. In the world of the late Roman Republic, clientela and its web of
power relations deeply affected the political landscape. Caesar exaggerates these aspects in
Gauls not only because the Roman landscape is dominated by clientela, but also because he
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wants to comment on the implications of this system in Rome of the 50s BCE. Leaders such as
Cicero, Pompey and Caesar amassed massive numbers of clients and in turn increased their
personal power. I will argue that Caesar’s exaggeration of Gallic clientela plays into this trend. I
have chosen to focus on clientela, as it speaks directly to Caesar’s internal and external
motivations. In doing this, I will be able to show what purpose the ethnography served Caesar
the general, the statesman, and most importantly, the conqueror.

A Note on Translation
For this paper, I will be using two different translations of the BG. The primary
translations I have used for this work are The Landmark Julius Caesar, a translation of the entire
body of Caesarian Commentarii, by Kurt A. Raaflaub and Robert B. Strassler. In addition, I have
also consulted James J. O’Donnell’s recently published The War for Gaul. The Raaflaub
translation highlights Caesar’s literary approach. It takes more of a holistic viewpoint and
includes more broad footnotes that focus primarily on Caesar’s references to Roman culture,
social norms, and other works of literature. In taking this approach Raaflaub and Strassler have
provided a BG that is centered within Roman society and literature. I have also chosen to use the
O’Donnell translation since it highlights a central theme of this paper, the purposeful nature of
Caesar’s rhetoric. O’Donnell and I share the opinion that the BG should be looked at as a work
meant to justify Roman colonialism, in which Caesar used the BG to solidify his position as a
conqueror. The combination of both translations will allow for a contextualized and focused
reading, which I will show how Caesar interacts with both the Roman world and his individual
reader. I have also translated certain passages with the guide of Professor Chris Trinacty that
highlight fundamental arguments and central themes of this paper in particular.
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Section II: Clientela in the Ethnographic
Excursus
As I discussed in the last chapter, scholars have challenged the ideas represented in the
ethnographic excursus of Book VI, attempting to find a more representative history of Gallic
society during the late-Iron age. Authors such as Johnston, Shadee, and Andrew Riggsby vary in
method. For example, Johnston discusses the interplay between the Germanic and Gallic
ethnographies and the concept of using ethnography to “mirror” Roman society. Shadee suggests
the appearance of a separation between the northern barbarian societies and Gaul using Caesar's
geographic ethnography, for example his use of the Rhine.44 Johnston challenges the reality of
the ethnography, in particular, the barbarianizations of Roman social norms.45 Riggsby also
discusses the differences of the Germanic and Gallic ethnographies in a concept he calls the
“‘other’ and the other ‘other’” using concepts apparent in the ethnography such as nomadic
fluidity, difference in civilizations, and religious beliefs to separate the Germanic and Gallic
ethnographies.46
Outside of comparing and contrasting how Caesar presents the Gauls and Germans,
Riggsby focuses on the ethnographic context in which Caesar is writing, particularly the
intertextuality between Caesar’s account and Greek ethnographies of the Gauls. Riggsby
attempts to define Caesar’s divisions of Gaul and the multitude of nations, regions, and tribes,
stating that Caesar changes these geographic and political barriers to suit his own needs. This
diversity of methodology and approach to reading the ethnography allows us to use a variety of
44
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tools in reading the ethnography such as othering, mirroring, intertextuality, barbarianization,
and Romanization.
Despite the variety of viewpoints and tools used to read Caesar’s ethnographic details, the
ethnographic excursus of book VI is still somewhat jarring to the Caesarian reader. In the middle
of the book, Caesar makes a dramatic and noticeable shift in style, voice, and subject material. At
the beginning of book VI, Caesar is in full campaign mode. The tone of the beginning of book VI
resembles the rest of the military narrative. The opening sections inform his reader of the day to
day movements of the army, interactions with the Gauls, and progress being made across the
Rhine. Preparing for an attack on the Germans, Caesar takes a moment to let the reader know
that a shift in narrative is about to take place, he writes:
As we get to this point, it seems appropriate to set out how Gaul and Germany live and
how these nations differ from one another.47
Caesar wants his reader to know that a change in subject is coming, and wants us to make note of
the change. In fact, scholars have made note of this change, and provided a multitude of reasons
for it.
In The War for Gaul, O’Donnell claims that the reason Caesar pauses the military
account to discuss the differences between the societies at this point in the narrative is because he
is about to discuss warfare with the Germans rather than the Gauls, and he wants his reader to
know the difference.48 O’Donnell writes that Caesar’s “reader of yearly installments would not
remember what he had said about them and their German neighbors at 4.1-4.”49 Raaflaub agrees
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with O’Donnell and adds that Caesar included the excursus to either A) justify entrance into the
Germanic landscape or B) distract the reader from the fact that little was gained in the second
crossing of the Rhine.50 Although this is a valid argument for Caesar’s reintroduction of
Germanic/Gallic ethnography, there is a difference between the ethnographic moments of IV.1-4
and the excursus of book VI: the depth to which Caesar indulges his reader in Gallic
ethnographic details.
In Book IV, Caesar gives only 4 sections to his reader concerning the barbarity of the
Germanic lifestyle. Caesar focusses on particularly barbaric traits mentioned by other ancient
ethnographers of Northern barbarians such as wearing animal skins, strange diet/lack of
agriculture, and abnormal size. Despite Caesar denoting the excursus as a comparison between
Gallic and Germanic societies, the themes of book IV are almost completely repeated at the end
of the ethnographic excursus. Although Caesar does add interesting factors such as the neverending Hercynian forest and magical creatures, the excursus of book VI is primarily a deep dive
into Gallic society.
Whereas book IV only discusses the basic customs of Germanic life, in the ethnography
of book VI Caesar places the societies of Germany and Gaul in direct opposition to one another.
This allows the Caesarian reader to compare and contrast the two societies and see a clear
difference between Gaul and Germany on the scale of civilization. The intention of this
comparison is to show Gaul’s resemblance to a more archaic Rome than a barbaric/Germanic
North. So, although Raaflaub and O’Donnell see the Germanic campaign of book VI behind the
digression, I believe it gives the Caesarian reader a better view of Gallic society and customs
with an eye towards their potential as future clients.
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Caesar makes a noticeable shift in how he crafts the Gallic ethnography. He goes from
informing the reader about the campaign in the military narrative to entertaining the reader with
exciting in-depth cultural analysis. Although I believe that the Germanic ethnography is essential
to the BG as a whole, there is something particularly interesting about the Gallic ethnography
that demands a close attention.51 In the Gallic ethnography, Caesar coalesces bits of ethnographic
information that he has already shared with his reader, such as human sacrifice and a reliance on
rumor. However, it is Caesar’s comments on the hierarchical structure of Gallic society that have
direct ramifications for his political and literary career.
The ethnography has several distinct sections, focusing on a broad range of Gallic elements
of society compared to the Germans:
● 6.11- Gallic society is reliant on hierarchical divisions and political factions from nations
to individual households. They primarily run on a two-nation system.
● 6.12- When Caesar arrives in Gaul, the Aedui are one powerful nation and the Sequani
the other. The Sequani added the Germans and Orgetorix as a patron which changed the
balance of power in Gaul. Caesar evened out the power balance.
● 6.13-Two classes in society, Knights and Druids, commoners are slaves. There is a panGallic Druidical council which leads the political and judicial world, particularly
presiding over the penal system and keeping the peace between the two powerful nations.
● 6.14-Druids do not participate in military affairs and are the scholars and religious leaders
of Gallic society.
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● 6.15- The Knight class of Gallic society participate in clientela as patrons. They lead the
tribes during the annual warring season, which ended when Caesar arrived.
● 6.16-Gauls practice a form of Do ut Des human sacrifice, in which they burn criminals
and vagrants in a wicker man.
● 6.17-Digression on Gallic religion-they worship similar Gods with Mercury at the center
of their pantheon.
● 6.18-Gauls are descended from Hades, they count by nights, sons are not seen in public
with their fathers.
● 6.19-Dowries are given by both families in Gallic weddings. Men have power of life and
death over their wives and children. Families and slaves are interrogated after the death
of a pater familias. Funerals are extremely lavish and the Gauls practice conspicuous
consumption-animals, items, and even clients are burned with the dead.
● 6.20- The Gauls use rumor as fact, particularly in matters of governance and war.
● 6.21- German barbarianization-No gods other than the sun and moon, no druids or
sacrifices, they hunt and exercise for war even children, they abstain from sex for as long
as possible as it makes them taller and stronger, men and women bathe together naked.
● 6.22-Germans do not farm, only eat meat and milk, they have no property ownership and
property is chosen by a magistrate so men can focus on war rather than farming and
expanding personal wealth.
● 6.23- No common magistrate in times of peace, banditry is a common practice to keep
military men hardened. Practice xenia, and guest friendship is very important.
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● 6.24-Gauls used to be more powerful than the Germans, however due to contact with the
Romans, the Gauls have become less barbarian and the Germans now have more virtus
than the Gauls.
● 6.25-6.28: Digression on the magical Hercynian woods, a never-ending forest which is
home to Ox/unicorns the shape of deer, giant Elk, and small elephants with giant horns.
These sections can be divided into two separate categories. One section is complete
barbarianization, which primarily focuses on Gallic religion. Caesar presents a “bizzaro world”
in which he takes Roman cultural themes such as religious beliefs and assigns the Gauls the
direct opposite belief (6.16-18, 20,21-28). It is somewhat comical how Caesar tells the Roman
reader that rather than being descended from Jupiter, the Gauls are descendants of Hades, or how
rather than counting by days the Gauls count by nights. Caesar presents Gallic religion as
simplistic compared to Rome, yet draws a hard line between their level of barbarity compared to
the Germans; after all, the Germans don’t even believe in the gods, only the Sun and the Moon.
These “bizzaro” qualities are basic barbarianizations that let the Caesarian reader know that Gaul
is not as civilized as Rome. Historically, the ethnographic excursus has attracted attention due to
these qualities.52 I recognize the interest in the extreme ethnographic qualities of the BG and the
historical necessity to accurately depict the Gauls in opposition to Caesar’s account.53 However,
I am more interested in what Caesar believed held together Gallic society. Caesar begins this
inquiry into Gallic by finding similarities between Gallic and Roman societies.
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A great example of this is VI.19, in which Caesar presents a quasi-Roman nuclear family
with the pater familias at the head of a household. Although this might seem like a small shared
custom, it gives a level of social complexity, or natural social order to the Gauls that is familiar
to Rome. We must remember that the Roman reader would for the most part be unfamiliar with
Gallic society, and these small cultural similarities ground Caesar’s argument for larger cultural
similarities such as clientela.
What particularly piques my interest is how Caesar approaches Gallic clientela. In the
first section, Caesar does not describe the differences between Gallic and Germanic society, as
he said was the purpose of excursus, but rather delves into a lengthy description of Gallic state
and individual clientela, Caesar writes:
In Gaul, factions divide not only all the nations, regions, and districts but almost
every household. Leaders of these factions are those men who in the estimation of
their followers are believed to have the highest authority; to their judgment and
decision are deferred all the most important matters under deliberation. This
practice seems to have been established from ancient times to ensure that no one
among the common people should lack support in a conflict with a more powerful
person. For no one allows those among the people for whom he is responsible to
be treated violently or unfairly, and if anyone acts contrary to this principle, he
loses all authority among his people.54
In this section, Caesar demonstrates Gallic hierarchies as a network of reciprocal relationships
between the powerful and the less powerful. There are two interesting cultural similarities in this
section that connect Gallic and Roman social functions. Firstly, in Gaul, political and judicial
power is based on one’s clients. Therefore, the more clients a man has, the more power he has in
the judicial and political realm. As a populares politician with a large number of clients himself,
Caesar understood this more than anyone, and his recognition of the Gauls’ ideas on power can
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be seen as self-serving, particularly due to the crafted nature of the ethnography. Secondly,
Gallic clientela was created in the “ancient times” to protect the weak from harm. This is
remarkably similar to the view of Roman clientela, if we believe the depiction found in
Dionysius of Halicarnassus:
After Romulus had distinguished those of superior rank from their inferiors, he
next established laws by which the duties of each were prescribed… He placed
the plebeians as a trust in the hands of the patricians, by allowing every
plebeian to choose for his patron any patrician whom he himself wished. In
this he improved upon an ancient Greek custom that was in use among the
Thessalians for a long time and among the Athenians in the beginning. For the
former treated their clients with haughtiness, imposing on them duties
unbecoming to free men; and whenever they disobeyed any of their commands.
They beat them and misused them in all other respects as if they had been
slaves they had purchased.55
In Gaul and Rome, clientela was meant to protect the weak from the abuses of the strong in its
historical/mythological beginnings. Despite the historical founding of Gallic clientela, Caesar
tells us many times that Gallic clientela does not protect the weak, particularly the common
people. Only one section later Caesar informs us that “only two classes of men enjoy any kind of
distinction and honor, since the common people are treated almost like slaves.”56 This interesting
paradox shows the difference between Caesar’s sources on the history of Gaul and the actual
conditions in Gaul. It seems the actuality of clientela in Gaul during Caesar’s campaign
resembles less the clientela of Romulus’ Rome but rather the ancient Greeks in pre-Solonic
Athens who abused their clients and treated them as slaves.
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Having introduced individual clientela, Caesar then gives us a lengthy description of
Gallic State clientela and the two patron states who compete for the patronage of all the Gallic
tribes. He writes:
This same way of doing things prevails in Gaul at large, for all the nations are
divided among two factions. When Caesar came to Gaul, the leaders of one
faction were the Aedui, those of the other the Sequani. The latter had been
weaker, as far as their own resources were concerned, since from ancient
times the Aedui enjoyed the greatest influence and had a large number of
dependents. The Sequani had therefore allied themselves with the Germans and
Ariovistus, winning them over with great sacrifices and lavish promises. After
several battles went their way, and all the Aedui aristocracy were killed, the
Sequani had gained such an advantage in power that they were able to bring most
of the clients of the Aedui over to their side.57
Caesar tells us that the Aedui, like the most powerful individual patrons, enjoy power throughout
Gaul due to the number of their client tribes. However, conflict and political strife is introduced
by the Sequani when they partner with the Germans. The Aedui, having lost their power, have no
control over the region and the bidding of the Sequani’s new patrons: Ariovistus and the
Germans. This power imbalance shows the frailty of state clientela in Gaul. The Germans
introduce non-Gallic patrons to the political realm of Gallic state clientela, which as Caesar tells
us in 6.12.5, led Divicicus to approach the Romans in friendship for aid. This is interesting as
according to Caesar of Book I, this is not the truth.58
In book I, Caesar tells us that the Helvetian entrance into the Roman province is what
spurred the campaign.59 It is not until the end of book I that Caesar introduces Ambiorix and the
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Germans and Divicicus’ call for aid. It is particularly striking that Caesar chooses to shift the
justification of the war as a defense of clientela and the stability of Gaul, rather than a protection
of the Roman province in “short haired” Gaul.60 Particularly as the next lines reframe the rest of
books II-V as a shifting state clientela. This device is usually subtle, however in 6.12 Caesar
literally frames the events of the military campaign in books I-V very clearly. He writes:
In other respects, as well, the influence and status of the Aedui had been
enhanced, and the Sequani had lost their position of leadership. The Remi had
stepped into their position. When it became clear that the Remi were as influential
with Caesar as the Aedui were, those nations that, because of ancient feuds, could
by no means ally themselves with the Aedui submitted as clients to the Remi. The
Remi protected their clients carefully and in this way held on to their new and
rather suddenly acquired position. Hence at that time the situation was such that
the Aedui were considered by far the first in leadership and status, and the Remi
held the second.61
This section of the ethnography is shocking, as the logic of what Caesar is saying changes our
understanding of the BG as a whole. He is redefining his entire campaign using clientela, and
expects us as the audience to go along with him. This information, although lumped in with the
rest of the excursus as “ethnography” is not purely ethnographic. It defines more exactly the
political realm of Gaul in its divisions, while the remainder discusses the Gauls as a homogenous
people. This section rebrands the military campaign as a game of Gallic state clientela in which
Caesar is now a major player. So, understanding that the excursus has been miscategorized for so
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long, what would the Caesarian reader make of a section that reintroduces us to the purely Gallic
war in which clientela is a major socio-political tool?62
This introduction into the factionalism of Gaul and the effects of Gaul’s state clientela are
meant to refocus the Roman audience. After all, at this point in the military narrative, Caesar’s
“Gallic war” has made diversions from fighting just Gauls. After the distractions of the British
and German campaigns, Caesar is informing his audience that this information will be vastly
important, and foreshadows the purely Gallic war to come in which state clientela will play a
large role. The campaign against Vercingetorix is heavily rooted in Gallic factionalism and
clientela, however if we are to believe the idea the Caesar is writing yearly reports, he wouldn’t
have known the role clientela would play. Caesar is refocusing an audience that he knows he will
soon be returning to. Caesars focus on loyalty and the strength of his leadership will have direct
ramifications on his return to Rome and it is clear that Caesar is speaking directly to his reader in
this section.
Unsurprisingly, book VI is not the first time Caesar mentions Gallic clientela, nor is it the
last. In each new challenge of the campaign, from the Helvetii to Vercingetorix, Caesar displays
how his Gallic allies and enemies change alliances, gain friendships, and add patrons and clients
alike. The first two sections of the ethnographic excursus bring up questions of how Caesar is
writing the BG, his intentions while writing, and the reality of Gaul during the death throes of the
Republic and Caesar’s rise to absolute power. In this essay, I will keep these questions in mind
while I dissect Caesar’s use of clientela throughout the BG and the implications of its use.

62

Rather than focusing on Britain, Germany, and Gaul, together, this section refocuses the
military narrative to concern Gaul alone.
30

Section III: Clientela and Framing the Gallic
Socio-Political Landscape
Turning to the Roman world, clientela was the reciprocal relationship between patrons and
clients and a cornerstone of the Roman socio-political hierarchy.63 Clientela permeated
relationships between powerful individuals and their followers from the mercantile world, street
gangs, the forum, and even foreign lands. In a political sense, it has been argued that clientela
was the glue that held together the Empire for hundreds of years. In his work Foreign Clientelae,
concerning the power of clientela in Rome and abroad, Ernst Badian writes,
The mystery of the cohesion of the empire through successive civil wars, and despite
manifest misgovernment now becomes more intelligible. The empire was based on the
personal loyalty of leading men throughout the provinces to leading families at
Rome, and this attachment proved to be independent of political vicissitudes and, as we
have seen, on the whole unaffected even by the fortunes of those families.64
Although Badian’s Foreign Clientelae has come under methodological scrutiny, this quote
shows the strength of clientela within Roman society.65 Badian suggests that foreign clientela
was so stable and concrete that it was able to withstand the shifting tides of political power
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during the Empire. Although Badian is discussing clientela in the peak of the Roman Empire (2nd
Century CE), clientela was also the glue that held together powerful hierarchies such as personal,
political, and state relationships in the late Republican period. There was a certain power in
clientela which made it a unique pillar of Roman society in what we think of as an ever-changing
socio-political world. This ancient interpersonal bond, which had roots in the very foundations of
Rome, withstood to the end of the Byzantine period, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Caesar used it
regularly to frame the narrative of the BG.66
In Rome, clientela was a reciprocal relationship, in which, high-class patrons received
political support and social prowess and their lower-class clients received services such as legal
representation and financial support. For example, one interesting feature of Roman clientela is
the salutatio, in which clients would address their patrons. This public address allowed patrons to
show off their power and status, and in exchange clients would receive money, food, or social
favors such as introductions for business (commendatio). The relationship of salutatio and
commendatio created a form of “cultural cohesion” that maintained the socio-political hierarchy,
where the powerful flaunted their power and received political support and their less influential
clients were able to navigate the political world with support. Clientela stratified political
hierarchy by enforcing the reciprocity of powerful individuals and their supporters.
In her work, The Mask of the Parasite, Cynthia Damon creates a division between this
form of reciprocal clientela and the image of the parasite character in Roman comedy. The
relationship of a parasite figure and their patron is more of an economy of sorts. These
relationships are purely economic. The “parasite” character, often represented as comedic levity
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in the plot of the plays, is able to do menial tasks and receive favors, particularly food.67
Clientela on the other hand is more of an ancient code of ethics which the Romans elevated to
the mos maiorum.68 Damon does display the inherent problems of the clientela system,
particularly the conflict between the powerful patron and the necessities of the client, however,
to better understand the system Caesar is using in the BG we must understand the societal weight
and respect given to clientela as a revered social construct in the Roman world.69
Caesar was deeply interested in the cross-cultural similarities between Gallic and Roman
clientela, and he makes note of clientela within the BG 14 times. Caesar uses this concept to
show his Roman reader that the Gauls were not completely “uncivilized,” to justify the duration
and purpose of his campaign, and to comment on how he would submit his power as the patron
of Gaul. All of which inform Caesar’s reader of his ideas concerning clientela within Rome.
Caesar argues that clientela permeated many Gallic hierarchies in some form or another.
Concerning clientela, Caesar either draws a parallel to Roman individual clientela or presents a
dramatic barbarianization. Caesar starts drawing similarities between Roman and Gallic clientela
when he explains that these relationships begin with filial fealty and hierarchy. The first level of
the Gallic hierarchy, like in Rome, is the pater familias, whose primary “clients” are his family.70
Caesar says that, like the Roman pater familias, the Gallic head of the household had the power
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of life or death over his family members and slaves, in addition they practice torture in order to
solve problems of the household:
Men have power of life and death over wives, as over children. When a well born
paterfamilias dies, his relatives assemble and, if there is suspicion about the death,
they interrogate wives as they would slaves.71
Caesar continues comparing Roman and Gallic clientela by informing the Roman reader that the
Knight (eques) class of society, similar to the Roman middle class eques, enjoys a higher level of
respect and socio-political power. The Gauls in Roman fashion also equate a number of clients to
wealth and a higher socio-economic status:
The other class is the Knights. When necessary and some war arises (which used
to happen yearly before Caesar’s coming, nations attacking other nations or
repelling attacks) they all take part in war. The most fortunate in family and
wealth have the most clients and slaves.72
Like their Roman counterparts, Caesar suggests a Gallic Cursus Honorum where military service
is implicit in wealth and socio-political position.73 After establishing the concrete similarities
between Roman and Gallic clientela, Caesar then compliments the Gauls on their loyalty to their
patrons. Caesar’s commentary on Gallic loyalty to patrons is apparent from the campaign against
Orgetorix all the way to his defeat of Vercingetorix. Caesar reiterates this before the battle of
Gergovia when he writes:
When they are recognized and Litaviccus’ lie revealed, the Haedui hold out their
hands in surrender, cast aside their weapons, and plead for their lives. Litaviccus
and his followers---in Gallic custom abandoning patrons in the worst misfortune
is very wrong--flee for Gergovia.74
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Although he compliments Gallic clients’ loyalty above, Caesar also takes time within the
ethnographic excursus to point out the more barbarian aspects of clientela. There, he warps the
loyalty he praises throughout the work by diverging from the Roman model of clientela, and
adding that the Gallic patrons had additional powers of life and death over slaves and clients
alike. In fact, Caesar points out a custom of the Gauls to subject slaves and clients to a fiery
human sacrifice after the death of a patron.
Funerals, by Gallic standards, are magnificent and lavish. They add to the flames
everything the living held dear, even animals. In recent memory, beloved slaves
and clients were burned together after the regular funeral was over.75
Although he is enlightening the Roman audience on a shared custom, this is the first
barbarianization Caesar points to concerning Gallic individual clientela. It could be argued that
the Romans did engage in human sacrifice in the arena, where slaves were sent to their death in
gladiatorial combat.76 This is a particularly intriguing argument, as these contests were often
part of the funeral procession of powerful Roman. However, it would be appalling to a Roman
sensibility to see the clients of a great patron like Decimus Junius Brutus fighting in the funeral
games dedicated in his posthumous honor, or burning them alive on a pyre. In Rome clients were
citizens, and would not be put to death without a trial and certainly not as a part of a funeral,
whereas slaves could be subjected to any means of torture and death.77 In showing the tie
between human sacrifice and clientela, Caesar shows the conflation of servitudo and clientela in
Gallic society.
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Caesar is very interested in Gallic servitudo as a concept within the BG, he uses a form of
slave (servus) or slavery (servitus), 32 times within the work.78 Caesar utilizes it most often to
describe the common people of Gaul being ‘in servitutem’ to the hierarchies of their society.79
Caesar continues this rhetoric of comparing Gallic clients to Roman slaves in the relationship
between the military aristocracy and their followers. Outside of familial bonds, military
patronage made up a majority of Gallic clientela. These relationships were between war chiefs
and their followers, mostly for the purpose of raiding or in the case of the BG, fighting with or
against the Romans. Caesar points out in the excursus of book VI that the military aristocracy
was one of the two major divisions of Gallic society, with the other being Druids and the rest of
society being “slaves”:
In all Gaul, two sorts of men stand out in rank and esteem. (For commoners are
treated almost like slaves, venturing nothing on their own, being asked no advice.
Many, oppressed by debt or huge levies or vengeful potentates, swear themselves
into service to nobles who have all the rights over them that masters have with
their slaves).80
This passage suggests an almost brain washed client with an utter lack of freedom or personal
sovereignty. Similar to Athens before the Solonic reforms, the Gallic common class often sell
themselves into a form of debt-slavery according to Caesar.81 Gallic clients and commoners alike
were sacrificed like animals, killing themselves in dedication to their patrons, and, as the
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Helvetian campaign of Book I suggests, participated in a form of forced migration at the whim of
extremely powerful warlords.
The Gallic conflation of clientela and servitudo continues to be emphasized in Caesar’s
conception of nomadic fluidity. As Johnston and Gruen have argued, Caesar is interested in how
freeing or debilitating nomadic fluidity can be to a society as well as the relationship between
fluidity and social stratification.82 This directly reflects the freedom that Gallic clients give up in
their clientela relationship. Caesar uses the German way of life to contextualize Gallic freedom
and nomadic fluidity. Within the scale of civilization, the people of Germania experience a form
of freedom through their nomadic lifestyle. Although Caesar is not arguing that they are freer
than Romans, he argues for a different form of freedom. They lived in a proto-socialist society,
where there was no ownership of land and power is set on an individual level.83 Therefore, all
members of society experienced a level of nomadic freedom. The reason Germanic fluidity
equates to freedom is because of the lack of social stratification in their society, they have no
clientela system, in contrast to the Gallic people who are highly stratified in their servitudo via
clientela. There was no military aristocracy to force common Germans to move from place to
place.84 In fact, the Germans aren’t even beholden to any form of property law:
No one has a definite and marked off portion of land as his own property; instead,
every year officials and leaders assign parcels of land, in sizes and locations
determined by their own judgment, to each of the families, clans, and groups of
men who appear before them, and in the following year, they force them to move
somewhere else.85
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The Germans have their land chosen by lot; their gods, the sun and the moon, travel as they do;
they have no worry of farmland as they persist on meat and milk, and their magistrates are only
selected in times of war. They are completely free of hierarchy and completely geographically
fluid. This would be the epitome of the barbarian in Rome.86 A free and wild society with no law
and order to protect them.
To truly separate the Germans from the hierarchies of Gaul and Rome, Caesar enlightens
his reader that their magistrates are chosen by lot. Similar to the Gauls, their military leaders do
have power of life and death over their soldiers, but unlike the Gauls, the Germans have no war
chiefs to whom warriors and commoners subject themselves.
When a nation either defends itself in war or wages it, magistrates are selected to
be in charge of war with the power of life and death. There is no common
magistrate in peacetime, but leaders of regions and cantons give judgments and
placate quarrels among their people.87
By showing the relationship between social stratification and fluidity, Caesar invents a free
Germanic society that is the complete opposite of Rome and sets up a half civilized, half
barbarian Gaul. The society of Gaul, like that of Rome, is highly stratified. They participate in
clientela, but their patrons, the military aristocracy, control all factors of life over the common
peoples militarily, socially, and geographically. The lack of freedom, as we see above, is that the
military aristocracy had the power of life and death over their clients, like a master would have
over their slaves in Rome.88
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The separation between Rome and Gaul comes in the form of their geographical fluidity.
Like the Germanic tribes, the Gallic peoples are also highly nomadic and have no conception of
land ownership. Due to the friction between social stratification (clientela) and nomadic lifestyle,
common people are forced into a form of strong-arm nomadic lifestyle where only the military
aristocracy had the power to decide where the tribe went. This explains why Caesar saw the
common people of Gallic societies as “slaves” to their forced mobility via their warlord patrons.
This can be seen in the first campaign against Orgetorix and the Helvetians. Orgetorix gains
power through his many clients and is able to control the movement of the Helvetians away from
their ancestral homeland and to the Roman province.89 Despite Orgetorix’s death, his supporters
among the military aristocracy continued the mission and forced the Helvetian commoners to
pack up their lives and burn their homes as they went. So, is Caesar’s conquest actually an
attempt to emancipate Gaul? While there are moments in which Caesar signals the benefits he
brings to Gaul, I believe Caesar’s Roman reader would probably not be interested in Caesar the
Gallic Emancipator.90 Caesar presents his Roman audience with his ability to acquire a valuable
new vassal state; a Gaul that is already on the path towards civilization and has an analogous
concept of clientela.
Here, Caesar is focusing primarily on the militaristic aspects of Gallic patronage, and
describing Gallic commoners as “slaves.” Caesar argues that individual clientela was less
advanced and downright barbaric in Gallic society compared to Rome. With the combination of
his use of slavery and fluidity, Caesar presents a Gallic lower and middle class that are slaves to
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their own social stratification. Through the conflation of servitudo/clientela as well as the
concept of nomadic fluidity/forced migration, Caesar presents to his reader the barbarity of Gaul,
yet he also initiates their ability to become more Roman. Caesar warps Gallic clientela from the
dining traditions presented by Posidonius and offers the Roman reader a proto-Rome that can be
taken in as a province and Romanized or “pacified” by conquest. By doing this he opens the door
to frame his conquest as such, a just war that would support his own state clients (the Aedui) and
make clients of all Gaul, a newly civilized province that would be loyal to Rome.

From Clients to Client Kingdoms
With most of Gallic society being slaves to one military leader or another, how could Caesar
possibly civilize them? He answers this question through his conception of military clientela and
the traditional Roman model of conquest. Caesar argues that he is able to civilize Gaul through
his conquest and turn them into a client kingdom. In order to understand how Caesar fits Gaul
into the custom of client kingdoms, we must look at Roman military clientela and the system of
client kingdoms to see how Caesar connected Gaul to the tradition of Roman conquest. A great
example of this model of conquest comes to us in the writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus.
Concerning foreign clientelae, he writes:
It was not only in the city itself that plebeians were under the protection of the patricians,
but every colony of Rome and every city that had joined the alliance and friendship with
her and also every city conquered in war had such protectors and patrons among the
Romans as it wished.91
This quote is particularly relevant as Dionysius is Greek and Greece was conquered nearly 100
years previous to his writings. Due to his position as a non-Roman writing in the Roman world,
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Dionysius gives us a unique perspective into the practices and methodologies Rome used in its
conquered provinces. As a recently Romanized Greek, having been through the process which
Caesar is imposing on Gaul, Dionysius understands the practical use of state clientela within the
bounds of Roman conquest.
Recent scholars have challenged the effectiveness of client states presented by Dionysius of
Halicarnassus. One of these questions comes from Angela Ganter in her article “Decline and
Glorification: Patron-Client Relationships in the Roman Republic”.92 Ganter argues against
theories of foreign clientela and social integration by deconstructing the relationship between
foreign and urban clientelae. Ganter is correct in her assessment that Badian overestimates the
power of foreign clientela as a mode of Romanization and cultural cohesion in reality,
particularly in her assessment on the lack of volunteerism in both urban and foreign clientelae.
Despite the consequences of forced clientelae, Dionysius shows us that state clientela was
viewed as a major tool in conquest and the mediation of relationships between Rome and its
provincial/client states.
In the history of Roman foreign affairs, there was a complicated system of both formal and
informal connectivity. The formal policy of treaties and pacts, such as the six treaties between
Rome and Carthage were rarely used in the military interventions of the Roman state.93 Due to a
lack of formal conflict resolution, individual bonds between Roman and foreign leaders stratified
peace between nations, particularly in Roman interventional wars. More formal agreements like
treaties were overshadowed by less formal bonds of amicitia.94 More often than not, the ties that
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bound the Roman state and their foreign allies were those of friendship. This allowed Roman
generals and politicians alike to maneuver around laws of engagement and the formal alliance
politics.95 This policy was in full force as early as the Illyrian war of 229/8BCE, and particularly
during the 2nd Macedonian war.96
In his work, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Erich S. Gruen argues that the
2nd Macedonian War was a watershed moment in the history of Roman interventionism.97 The
2nd Macedonian war represented a fundamental change because the terms amici (friends) and
socii (allies) became one in the same. Therefore, the policy of amicitia became the traditional
mode of diplomacy for military intervention during the wars of expansion from the second
century BCE on. When Rome extended amicitia to an individual or particular government, a
Roman leader would offer a form of protection in which Rome would simultaneously aid their
friends, and expand the bounds of their own empire.
Gruen argues that with the conflation of amici and socii, amicitia and clientela also became
synonymous. Roman generals would require an exchange of reciprocal fides from their Greek
allies for Roman amicitia in the form of military aid. If we understand clientela as a reciprocal
exchange of political alliance from clientes to patroni for services such as protection, financial
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support, or judicial representation, then we can understand interventional amicitia as a form of
military patronage.98
This form of military patronage or traditional Roman conquest can be seen particularly in
Pompey’s wars in the East. When reading accounts of Pompey Magnus’ campaigns against
Mithridates, it is easy to get bogged down by all the kings he engages with and the clientela
politics he practices.99 Like Gaul, the East was massive, it encompassed lands from the former
Persian Empire, to Judea, Cilicia, Syria, Galatia, Parthia, and many others. Each of these
territories had different rulers and different opinions on the Roman conquest. To deal with this
vast landscape, Pompey extended amicitia and his support to rex sociusque et amicus such as
Tigranes, Deiotarus, Phraates, and many others to systematically drive out Mithridates. His
mission was ultimately successful and with it came his triumph in 61BCE.100 However, as Robin
Seager tells us in Pompey: A Political Biography, not only did Pompey become a famous Roman
with unprecedented wealth after his campaigns in the East, but the relationships he made with
Eastern rulers made him the patron of entire provinces and kingdoms.101
These relationships, although separated by the Mediterranean, were directly linked to the
power Pompey had in Rome. In his approach to amassing power and foreign clients, Pompey
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laid out a sort of blueprint for Caesar by showing that Roman ideas of amicitia and clientela
could be wielded as means to conquer. Pompey’s successes in the East laid the ground work for
Caesar to engage in a campaign in which he could both divide and conquer a vast land mass such
as Gaul and gain allies to increase his political influence in Rome. The Pompeian model was to
create allies and use those allies to replace the ruling class (established native governments) with
a Roman state apparatus. In order to conquer Gaul and “civilize” them (by his ethnocentric view
point), Caesar needed to use the traditional mode of Roman conquest on the Gallic “barbarians”
rather than Eastern. Caesar does this in three ways 1) creating his own form of “Gallic Kings”
that acted as his footholds in the Gallic politics, 2) showing the Gauls’ ability to practice state
clientela, and, 3) justifying the continuation of the war by showing the stasis of Gallic state
clientela.
Unlike Caesar, Pompey had the aid of rex sociusque et amicus in the East that allowed him to
establish and maintain control over newly conquered Roman territories. The East was familiar to
the Roman reader: they had established cities, familiar socio-political hierarchies, and known
customs. Pompey’s eastern campaigns also had the “aid” of powerful enemies such as
Mithridates.102 The power of these “big bad” villain archetypes allowed the everyday Roman to
justify Pompey’s campaign. One only needs to look at the Carthaginian wars against Hannibal
and his father to find that nothing unites the Roman people more than a despotic foreign
adversary.103 Pompey’s wars in the East fit a model of Roman conquest that began in the third
century BCE, a traditional conquest between kings, consuls, and allies.
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Gaul was not entirely a traditional conquest. As Caesar tells us, Gaul, like Rome, had no
kings. In fact, in the first campaign, Orgetorix was sentenced to death for attempting to become a
rex.104 As Caesar suggests, it is a period in Gaul’s socio-political development in which there are
no kings and no republic. The only hierarchy within the Gallic society was based on clientela.
Due to a lack of absolute leadership in the form of kings or consuls, Caesar has the
opportunity to “introduce” the Republic to a country reminiscent of Rome after the fall of
Tarquinius Superbus. Therefore, Caesar had to be more creative and purposeful in his approach
to contextualize and justify the conquest of Gaul for his Roman audience. Caesar used two main
strategies in mapping traditional Roman military patronage onto his Gallic campaign: the use of
rex sociusque et amicus, and the implementation of patron states. Caesar first followed in the
footsteps of previous successful conquests and created his own form of rex sociusque et amicus.
These Gallic “kings” took form in political advisors such as Divicicus the Aedui and military
leaders to whom he extended the tradition title of amicus senati populique Romani, such as
Commius the Atreban, Cingetorix, and Piso the Aquitanian.105
In books I and II, Divicicus the Aeduian, perhaps Caesar’s greatest ally in Gaul, aids him by
giving political support, being a voice for Rome in the pan-Gallic druid council, and warning
Caesar of rebellions and future enemies.106 These actions gave Caesar the ability to solidify his
Gallic position from the start of the campaign, which allowed him to go back to the Aedui as an
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ally from the campaign against the Helvetii, until they betray him and join Vercingetorix’s
campaign in book VII. Due to his clientship, Divicicus, like Pompey’s allies in the East, gave
Caesar a foothold to begin a traditional Roman conquest of replacing the political status quo of
Gaul with Roman rule.
When Caesar first arrived in Gaul, the Aedui and Sequani were the two biggest patron states,
with the Aedui higher on the pecking order. In order to gain prominence over the Aedui, the
Sequani added the Germans (Ariovistus) as their patrons and become the most powerful Gallic
patron nation. The addition of Ariovistus and the Germans created friction between the two
dominant Gallic nations, disrupting statewide clientela. In showing this power struggle, Caesar
shows the Gauls’ inability to practice peaceful state clientela without Roman intervention.107
This power imbalance and the German problem caused Divicicus to travel to Rome to acquire a
non-Gallic patron for the Aedui.108 After the defeat of the Sequani, the Remi became the next
powerful patron nation. Therefore, the war against the Remi and all following campaigns are the
natural duty of Rome as an honorable patron state. If Caesar did not defend his own clients (the
Aedui) there would be yet another struggle for power leading to an unstable Gaul.109 Caesar
continuously expands his geographic definition of Gaul until Rome and subsequently Caesar
were the patroni omnis Galliae.110 In doing so, Caesar created a new model for client kingdoms
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that fits the “uncivilized” structure of Gaul as well as the Roman model of conquest, Romanizing
through systematic conquest.

Competing Patrons and the Rhetoric of Liberty
Having introduced the cultural similarities/differences of clientela in Gaul and Rome, and
framing his conquest using State clientela, Caesar frames the final campaign of Vercingetorix as
a competition between two rival patrons. The rebellion of Vercingetorix in book VII is a
culmination of all the previous Gallic and Germanic leaders before him. He is organized, tactical,
loved by the Gallic people, and wants nothing more than to undo the work of Caesar. In Caesar’s
view, he is pacifying Gaul, but for Vercingetorix Caesar is enslaving the Gauls. Caesar would
have us believe and recognize that Vercingetorix is the enemy which the Roman people should
despise. Caesar frames their competition in this way to highlight the barbarian nature of
Vercingetorix’s rebellion. As Caesar has discussed in the ethnographic excursus of Book VII, the
Gauls conflate servitudo and clientela. Caesar’s patronage represents a Roman clientela that
would free the common peoples through a “civilized” form of individual and state clientela.
Vercingetorix, the closest thing to a Gallic Hannibal or Mithridates, represents the archaic status
quo of Gaul. In book VII, Caesar shows the Roman reader the absurdity of creating a pan-Gallic
rebellion to fight against their own process of civilization and freedom.
Caesar introduces his framework by writing in book VII:
Vercingetorix worked as enthusiastically as he had promised to recruit other nations,
luring their leaders with gifts and promises. He picked men suited for the task, whose
skillful speech or existing friendships could win others over.111
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This method of patronage is much different than Caesar’s. Caesar is an outsider; as a foreign
conqueror, his patronage is earned through victories won either through existing friendships or
on the back of the Roman war machine. His patronage is also secured and upheld through a
reciprocal exchange of hostages: Roman foreign clientela practiced by a Roman conqueror.
Caesar argues that his form of patronage is much better and civilized than any Gallic patron. In
the excursus Caesar writes:
The arrival of Caesar had changed conditions: the hostages had been returned to the
Aedui; their patronage over their previous clients had been restored and new one
established with Caesar’s help (because those who had attached themselves to the
friendship of the Aedui found that they profited from better conditions and a fairer
system of rule). In other respects, as well, the influence and the status of the Aedui had
been enhanced, and the Sequani had lost their position of leadership.112
With the Aedui as an example of his Gallic clientes, Caesar presents Roman reciprocal clientela.
Caesar offers connections, military aid, and stability. What could Vercingetorix offer the people
and nations of Gaul?
Vercingetorix is a native patron. He is well connected and uses existing friendships and
promises of Gallic liberty to persuade clients to join his cause. Vercingetorix is able to unite the
Gallic tribes and nations easier than Caesar, as he doesn’t need to continuously maintain their
fealty through “pacification.” Rather Vercingetorix is using a method of patronage that was
natural and deep rooted in Gallic society before Caesar. As a result of being part of a native
resistance, Vercingetorix is able to add clients quickly and maintain them without the tricky
process of pacification.
Caesar shows the clashing of his Roman patronage/rhetoric of conquest and the patronage of
Vercingetorix/rhetoric of freedom perfectly in a speech delivered by Critognatus and
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Vercingetorix’s “last words”. According to Caesar, at the end of his speech concerning Gallic
freedom, Critognatus says:
So, what is my advice? Do what our ancestors did in the war (hardly equal to this one)
with the Cimbri and the Teutones. Driven into towns and forced by similar need to
sustain life on the corpses of those whose age made them useless for fighting, they
never surrendered. If we did not have their example, I would still think it beautiful to
establish our own and hand it on to posterity in the name of liberty. What war was ever
like that? Ravaging Gaul and bringing huge disaster, the Cimbri finally left our land and
headed elsewhere. They left us our rights, our laws, and our freedom. What do the
Romans seek or want, driven by envy, but to settle in the farms and cities of a people they
know are famed and powerful in war and to impose endless slavery (servitutem) on
them? They fight wars for no other reason. If you do not know what goes on in distant
nations, look nearby at Gaul reduced to a mere province, it’s rights and laws transformed,
bowing their axes, oppressed in endless slavery (provinciam redacta iure et legibus
commutatis securibus subiecta perpetua premitur servitute)113.
It may be perplexing why Caesar would include this speech in the narrative of the BG. However,
in looking closer at this speech, it is clear that Caesar is cleverly showing his reader the barbarity
of Gaul through their conceptions of clientela.
Critognatus is part of the Gallic aristocracy, a select group of the society that because of
their military status are able to collect the benefits of clientela. The primary benefit of Gallic
clientela, as Caesar tells us in 6.13, is a massive number of commoners who serve as “clients'' to
a small number of warlord patrons. In actuality, this is not a reciprocal clientela relationship, as
Caesar’s reader would be accustomed to in Rome; Gallic clientela is more like Roman servitudo.
Critognatus believes that if Caesar takes over as the ruling class of Gaul, then he will become a
member of the common class and therefore a slave to his new Roman patron, as his clients are
slaves to him. Caesar and his Roman reader conceive this as barbaric, since clientela is not
slavery in Rome. Caesar wants us to acknowledge that Critognatus’ view of clientela is so
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centered in barbaric thought that he can only see clientela as slavery. From the Roman
perspective, they offer peace, societal advancement, and a place within the Roman empire, but
Critognatus is blinded by the social norms of his Gallic forefathers that he cannot see the reality
of what Caesar would bring to Gaul.
The combination of this rhetoric of freedom and total submission to one’s patron is
continued when Caesar writes after the battle of Alesia:
On the following day Vercingetorix called a meeting and pointed out that he had
not undertaken this war to advance his own interests but to serve the cause of the
common freedom. (communis libertatis causa demonstrat) yet now there was
no choice but to yield to Fortune, and he offered himself to his fellow Gauls for
whichever action they chose: they could take his life to appease the Romans or
hand him over alive.114
It is clear that Caesar very carefully crafted this passage. Firstly, Vercingetorix continues the
rhetoric that Caesar introduced at the beginning of his rebellion. The reason for this war was to
preserve Gallic freedom and way of life, despite its apparent “barbarity,” a nod to Caesar’s use of
Critognatus’ speech. Secondly, he shows that while Vercingetorix is surrendering his position as
a patron, he is also giving his life and all personal sovereignty over to the new patronus omnis
Galliae. He offers himself as a mode of appeasement to Gaul’s new Roman patron: Caesar. Even
while surrendering the fight for Gallic freedom and customs, Vercingetorix follows the customs
of Gallic clientela that Caesar so carefully illustrated in the excursus of book VI.
Caesar is allowing the Gallic perspective to provide a sort of rhetorical contest. Books I-VI
show Caesar’s rhetorical conquest in three main ways as I have argued previously: 1) highlight
cultural similarities of Gallic and Roman clientela, 2) single out the barbarian aspects Gallic
clientela, especially its similarity to slavery, and 3) civilize through state clientela conquest. By
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showing the Gallic perspective, like any good statesman, scholar, and rhetorician, he provides a
counter argument in order to round out his argument. After all Caesar is writing in part for his
enemies in the Roman Senate who believe his war is illegal, therefore he challenges his own
argument with Critognatus to prove the barbarity of Gallic thought and indicate his own
justification for the war.
Showing that the Gauls would quite literally eat their own rather than change their barbaric
ways of society proves the essential nature of Caesar’s war.115 Caesar is providing the senate and
streets with evidence that support his claims made in the excursus of Book VI. A close reading of
how Caesar presents Gaul’s ideals on liberty once again reveals barbarian tendencies within
Gallic society that can be improved upon/stabilized by Roman rule. In the Landmark Julius
Caesar, Raaflaub suggest that the Roman reader would have deemed Critognatus’ speech as
“vile cruelty” because of its mention of cannibalism which the Roman audience found “utterly
repugnant.”116 By showing the barbarity to which Critognatus was willing to subject his troops –
literal cannibalism – Caesar is asking his Roman reader a simple question: at what point does
loyalty become enslavement? Critognatus’ speech and Vercingetorix’s surrender reveal that the
final Gallic resistance’s purpose was to keep hold of the traditional Gallic way of life, rather than
submit to Roman rule and the Roman way of life. However, the Gallic way of life included their
practice of subjugating Gallic commoners through clientela. Critognatus is telling his clients, his
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soldiers, who are indebted and as Caesar argues, enslaved to him, that to be “loyal” to their
Gallic customs, his clients must continue the atrocities of their own enslavement.117
Caesar manipulates this Gallic rhetoric of liberty to suggest the transformation that Gaul
could undergo once taken under the wing of the Republic and his own personal patronage.
Rather than being slaves to their patrons as was Gallic custom, his conquest would implement
the Roman “civilized” way of patronage that would make clients of all Gaul. Caesar offers Gaul
a form of patronage that would do away with the lack of freedom “disguised” as Vercingetorix’s
rhetoric of liberty. Therefore, it is somewhat comical that Critognatus points to the state of “short
haired” Gaul when he says: “look nearby at Gaul reduced to a mere province, it’s rights and laws
transformed, bowing their axes, oppressed in endless slavery.” The Roman reader would be
perplexed at such a philosophy; after all the late Republic was one of the most violent eras of
Roman history, rife with civil wars and violence. Caesar offers Gaul the ability to escape the
civil strife of their own political turmoil, and what nation, including Rome would not want to be
free of internal stasis and in a state of perpetual peace? To the Caesarian reader, Critognatus’
speech proves his classification as a barbarian. This speech is another example of Gallic
barbarity, in which clients would be forced to eat their dead companions on the orders of their
commanders. Caesar and Rome do not offer this form of state clientela. They offer a reciprocal
relationship between Rome and a province as they did with Greece, Spain, and the nations of the
East before.
This explains why Caesar continuously points to the Gauls’ habit of conflating clientela with
servitude. Caesar purposefully enlightened his reader to the Gauls’ “uncivilized” way of
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patronage. Even the soldurii, men with status in their own right, had to participate in this
barbaric tradition that Critognatus holds so dear.118 In this Caesar indicates to his reader that
Gallic views on freedom were so skewed and barbarian that they would fight against the Romans
and in doing so, their own common process of civilization and freedom from the barbarity of
Gallic clientela. Caesar uses clientela to show his Roman audience that the only way for Gallic
peoples to truly be free, was paradoxically through Roman conquest and eventual absorption into
the Roman sphere of influence, thus showing Caesar’s ethnocentrism and Darwinian
resemblance.
In Caesar’s rhetoric of clientela, he illuminates a shared custom between the Gauls and the
Romans (clientela) and in doing so showed his Roman audience his creation of a new model that
would serve as the groundwork for a Gallic Client Kingdom. He did so in order to create a
sympathetic reader who would see the Aedui as a potential client of Rome; a value added for the
collection of land, troops, and taxes, but also in essence, a group that would resemble their own
clients. Caesar highlights the extremism of certain aspects of Gallic patronage to show how
deep-rooted loyalty is in their society. Caesar is telling his reader that if the Gauls were willing to
sacrifice themselves for their patrons, then with Roman pacification, what would they be willing
to do in defense of Rome? Not only does Caesar show the benefit of his war by highlighting
Gallic clientela, he creates a reader that would view his war as a just defense in the name of
patronage. If the Aedui and Gaul itself were clients of Rome, and Rome would one day reap the
benefit, then it would be extremely dishonorable for Caesar to abandon them in their time of
need.
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Caesar’s readers/listeners would have been both clients and patrons alike.119 In framing the
conquest of Gaul as ultimately based on clientela, Caesar made his reader contextualize and
sympathize through their own personal experience. Would the Roman reader abandon their
clients and still expect to gain the benefits of patronage? By stressing this social
system/obligation, the BG becomes a narrative of Caesar aiding Gallic clients and turning Gaul
into a “pacified” client kingdom. To do so, Caesar needed to support his client kingdoms
continually, lest they fall into the hands of another Gallic nation or patrons such as Vercingetorix
who would lead to destabilization, barbarianization, and the loss of Gaul’s clientship. By framing
the socio-political hierarchy of Gaul as clientela at the state and individual levels, Caesar could
graft it onto his own social rhetoric to justify his campaign.
A counter argument to this is that Caesar had no need to justify his war in Gaul. He was a
popular leader, with the support of the people, and after the wars of expansion, the common
Roman would need no justification for his war. However, in the political turmoil of the Late
Republic, Caesar needed to justify his war in some way. If he had not, he would have to face the
punishments of political rivals such as Cato the Younger, who suggested Caesar be arrested for
an illegal war or turned over to the Germanic enemy to suffer in whatever way the barbarians
saw fit.120 Cicero would later write in De Republica:
Those wars are unjust which are undertaken without provocation. For only a war
waged for revenge or defense can actually be just, no war is considered just unless
it has been proclaimed and declared, or unless reparation has first been demanded.
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But our people by defending their allies have gained dominion over the whole
world.121
Caesar would have his Roman readers believe that there is no greater cause for a war than to
defend clients and friends of Rome. The provocation of his just war came when the Aedui, a
people in amicitia and clientela with Rome, requested aid. His continuation of the war
represented a continued defense of added clients and added friends against the barbarity of Gallic
clientela.

Mafioso Clientela: A Warning to Rome
Using clientela as a major justification not only creates a motivation for the eight-year
campaign, but it also allows Caesar to confront his Roman audience and their own practices of
clientela. Caesar was not the first to write about Roman clientela, nor the first to interrogate
problems with the clientela system. Plays such as the Miles Gloriosus by Plautus also presented a
sort of exposé of its social function. In the play, Plautus explored the relationship between the
Braggart Soldier (Pyrgopolynices) and his parasite (Artotrogus). It has been argued by Fontaine
in his article “Before Pussy Riot: Free Speech and Censorship in the Age of Plautus” that
through a series of allusions and jokes, Plautus presents his audience anti-tyrannical messages
concerning free speech. Therefore, the parasite character serves as a warning for the audience to
the negative aspects of clientela.122 The parasite character feeds the ego of his patron, blinding
him to the reality of his life and in turn, receives money, food, and gifts. It could be argued that
Caesar, in his comparison of Gallic and Roman clientela, also presented a warning to his Roman
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reader. However, if the rhetoric of Caesar is to be seen as colonial/imperial as I have argued
above, then the BG is not so much a critique of clientela as a reiteration of its power.
I believe that the relationship between Caesar and his Gallic clientes served as a very
serious warning to the people of Rome. For instance, when all of Caesar’s Gallic clients join with
Vercingetorix, we see how Caesar deals with unruly clients. He unapologetically does not allow
the noncombatants of the Mandubii into the Roman fortifications, as they were prepared to fight
against Caesar in the first place. He writes:
The Mandubii, who had let them into the town, are required to leave with their
children and wives. When they reached the Roman fortifications, they wept and
prayed to be taken in and fed as slaves. But Caesar put out guards on the ramparts
and forbade their admission. (At Caesar dispositis in vallo custodibus recipi
prohibebat.)123
Caesar is letting the Romans who may be plotting against him and supporting his enemies like
Cato the Younger, know that as soon as they are prepared to go against him, there is no pleading
to extend mercy, even from women and children.
It could be argued that in contrast to Caesar’s use of absolute violence is his use of
clementia. In a diverse canon of accounts, Caesar often extends a noble clemency to his Roman
enemies. This clemency can be seen in stories of even Caesar’s earliest career in which he spares
his piratical kidnappers.124 Most notable is Caesar’s use of clementia in the Civil Wars, in which
Caesar extends mercy to Roman adversaries such as Cato and Brutus. As David Konstan argues
in his 2005 article “Clemency as a Virtue,” clemency was a novel idea in the death throes of the
Republic. He writes that Caesar was “the first Roman to elevate restraint to the status of a
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policy.”125 Caesar was unapologetic and very clear about his use of clementia and dispatched it,
in the Civil Wars period.126
However, Caesar of the BC and his later political career is not the Caesar of the BG. He
has a different enemy and his political career is not as solidified as it is after crossing the
Rubicon in 49 BCE. Due to this, Caesar very rarely dispatches clementia, in fact, Caesar only
makes mention of clementia twice in the entire work.127 An example of Caesar not showing
clemency is the Aedui, who for eight years of the campaign were Caesar’s closest Gallic friends
and allies and who for eight years of the campaign were Caesar’s closest Gallic friends and allies
were not safe from Caesar’s lesson about patronage.128 The Aedui and the rest of the surviving
soldiers of Vercingetorix were given as slaves to his soldiers for their defiance, “one for every
man.” Caesar does tell us that some of the Aedui and Arverni are spared so that Caesar may “use
them to win over their nations.”129 However, if it wasn’t for their position as a stabilizing force in
the new trans-alpine Gallic province, and a value to Caesar, it can be very easily argued that they
would have faced the same fate as the Menapii. This should not be seen as what Konstan
describes as “pragmatic clementia” as the Aedui are not Romans, and it would be teleological to
assert Caesar’s later political practices into the BG without any textual evidence. Particularly as
slavery to Caesar’s soldiers is not act of clemency.
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In his destruction of the rebellion and with the Aedui serving as a reminder of such,
Caesar shows his clients in Rome the price they will pay if they devalue his patronage: full
Mafioso vendetta violence. Caesar meant to show that, like any conqueror, he was able to wield
the power he acquired in Gaul within the Roman political landscape without remorse.130 Despite
his use of clementia in future works, the entire thematic use of clientela justified Caesar’s
conquest of Gaul. It was also meant to show that when the “good faith” of clientela is broken, as
it was in Gaul, Caesar the Conqueror had one mode of correction, pacification by means of the
sword.
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Conclusion: The Value of the Gallic Pacification
Throughout the BG, Caesar often uses the term “pacified.” Famously and confidently in
BG 2.34, only 2 years into his Gallic campaign, Caesar writes his rebus gestis omni Gallia
pacata, translated by Raaflaub as “With all of Gaul pacified by these successes.” Caesar uses
derivations of pacare 10 times throughout the BG, and in each time, meant to describe that either
a new land, enemy, or all of Gaul has been brought to pacification by Caesar and his army.131 In
my first reading of the BG, I believed that this was meant for Caesar to show the Roman people
Caesar’s achievement. I believed that for each new pacified land and people there would be an
added part of his triumph in Rome. However, understanding how essential clientela was to
Caesar’s campaign and the narrative, I now believe that this pacification was meant to show the
value Gaul and its newly subdued people added to the Roman empire.
In the preface of his newly published translation The War for Gaul, James J. O’Donnell
presents the complexities of Caesar’s narrative, and its untold brutality. O’Donnell tells us that
there is a divide between what Caesar wanted us to feel and believe, and the actuality of ancient
warfare. He writes concerning the realism of Caesar’s military campaign:
War is a mad, unnatural thing. Killing is hard work and dangerous; the life surrounding
the few days of actual battle is arduous… a real victory doesn’t take place on the day of
the battle, but the next day or the next week. The victory is won when the defeated
commander decides not to risk another battle. He may be short on manpower or food, or
perhaps he is not confident that his men will have the will to respond well if he
commands them. Or is it won when a community decides not to muster forces and fight
but to pay protection money instead and settle for subservience?132
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O’Donnell argues that the winning of a war is not entirely decided upon by the tactical elements
that Caesar describes in agonizing detail. Wars such as Caesar’s are the actualization of bitter
violence, resulting in loss of life to such an extent that a communal breaking of spirit is created, a
“pacification” in Caesarian terminology. The brutality of war, which Caesar leaves out of his
campaign narrative, is the very thing we should keep in mind while reading the BG and writing
about the it’s rhetorical purposes.
From a modern perspective, I am extremely sympathetic to the Gallic cause, particularly
Critognatus’ speech. It is an emotional speech that truly sheds light on what is at stake for the
Gallic inhabitants. Echoes of this rhetoric are seen in almost every anti-colonial, native resistance
in history. In this speech, Critognatus delivers a Gallic equivalent to William Wallace in the Film
Braveheart or the creed to the Irish Easter Resistance of 1921, “Tiocfaidh ár lá'' or “our day will
come” both Celtic receptions of this original Celtic resistance, and Caesar purposefully includes
it in the text. Obviously, a modern reader will sympathize with Critognatus as a freedom fighter
because of our modern conceptions of freedom and colonialism. In fact, as Bijan Omrani points
out in his book Caesar’s Footprints, Vercingetorix and his rebellion inspired French nationalism
during the Napoleonic era. In fact, Vercingetorix’s rebellion inspired Henri d’Orleans to write a
dedication to Vercingetorix and his righteous cause in 1859, going as far to say, “he is not even
without the hollow of martyrdom” while comparing him to Joan of Arc.133 Napoleon, who took a
particular interest in the BG erected a statue of Vercingetorix at Alesia in the emperor's own
image.134 Caesar’s Roman reader would not share in this sentiment. The Roman reader would be
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faced with a classical question that we face, even in modernity: what cultural norms separate a
freedom fighter from a terrorist?
Yet Caesar’s rhetoric was meant to detract from the death and enslavement of hundreds
of thousands of Gallic men, women, and children. Caesar would have his reader believe the BG
is a “captain’s log” of battles won, tactics used, and territories conquered in the name of Rome
and all her glory. To completely take such a narrative as fact ignores the wake of Caesar’s
conquest of Gaul, what some have called a Gallic Holocaust. Understanding Caesar’s use of
clientela as a cover for imperialism, helps to uncover that Caesar’s writing did not represent the
actuality of the war of Gaul, but a purposeful and highly propagandized version of events.
However, the untold story of the breaking of Gaul fits Caesar’s narrative of the “value added” of
Gaul. Through pacification, Rome now has a client kingdom, with soldiers ready to fight for it,
who have the ability to fight like Romans. A breaking of wills or pacification as Caesar puts it is
the very thing that makes a great soldier, and if the Gauls are as loyal as the soldurii, and have
the ability to become Romanized militarily, then Caesar the conqueror has added value to the
Roman state: amassing a million troops awaiting to be trained across the Alps.
When discussing the value of pacification to the Roman state, one only needs to look to
the soldurii to see how Gaul would benefit Caesar and Rome. Despite their lack of Roman
tactical proficiency, Caesar reminds his reader at every turn that Gallic soldiers are extremely
loyal and very brave.135 The loyalty of the Gauls is best represented in Caesar’s description of
the soldurii. The soldurii show their dedication to the military aristocracy in dramatic fashion
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that resembles that of honorary suicide. Caesar tells us that when the soldurii of a powerful
Gallic patron dies, they either plunge themselves into death on the battle field or commit suicide:
While all our men were occupied there, Adiatunnus, their supreme commander,
appeared from another part of the town with 600 loyal men they call soldurii.
They share life’s goods with others to whom they vow their friendship. If any
violence befalls them, either they endure the same fate together or commit
suicide. In the memory of men there has been no man who refused to die himself
when someone to whose friendship he was pledged was killed.136
There is almost an excitement to the language in this passage that contrasts to the very matter-offact and dry style of the rest of the military narrative. In this exaggeration, although clearly a
barbarianization, it shows the true dedication that Gallic clients had for their military patrons.
Here Caesar defines the bounds of Gallic loyalty. After all, how different are the soldurii
from Caesar’s troops who give up their own bodily autonomy for 8 years on the campaign? The
separation between the Roman soldier and the Gallic soldurii is their total dedication, to give
their lives to the last man. Although Caesar does glorify men such as his supporting officers and,
in rare occasions, individual centurions, their achievements as represented in the BG are far from
a dedication to give their lives to the last man for their commander.137 Although barbarian in
nature this total sacrifice of life is astonishing. Caesar wants to show his Roman audience that
after pacification, Romanization, and Roman military professionalism, these Gauls would be
excellent additions to the Roman army as an extension of his Gallic patronage.
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Not only is Caesar showing the value of their new Gallic clients to the Roman State, he is
sending a very clear message to his political enemies in Rome. He just spent eight years
“pacifying” one million future troops and added a massive power to his political tool belt. Caesar
is sending a very clear message to his rivals and enemies in the senate, who are threatening to
take away his imperium. He doesn’t need all Roman soldiers to march on Rome. For the entirety
of the BG Caesar has used Gallic auxiliaries and the magnificent German cavalrymen.138 He now
has pacified Gallic men, who have been civilized through conquest and who are willing to do his
bidding militarily.
In his essay in Foreign Clientelae Reconsidered, Pragg writes concerning auxilia externa:
The importance of such relationships [foreign clientelae] and military service that goes
with them, serves to be a more central place in our analysis of Republican Imperialism.
This article argues that in Badian’s Foreign Clientelae, Badian vastly overlooks how dependent
Rome was on these auxiliaries gained in foreign campaigns. Pragg posits 4 modes of recruitment
for auxilia externa: 1) allies: Caesar has used allies such as the Aedui for a majority of the work,
2) client kings: such as Caesar’s Gallic rex sociusque et amicus, 3) subjected peoples: the
products of Caesar’s “pacification”, and 4) mercenaries: such as the German cavalrymen which
Caesar gives such high praise to.139 Caesar has all four methods of recruitment and, as Andrew
Riggsby argues in his book Caesar in Gaul and Rome, Caesar has spent seven books of the BG
describing their increasing skill and Roman techniques in warfare.140 The value of Caesar’s
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campaign is not simply land and taxes, but hundreds of thousands of newly pacified soldiers,
which explains why he gives such high praise to the soldurii or his German cavalry mercenaries.
This reminds us that we must acknowledge Caesar’s rhetoric as that of a conqueror who
massacred a third of the Gallic population and enslaved another third.141 This is more than just
the rhetoric of Gaul’s process of civilization, it is actual subjugation posed as the rhetoric of
liberation. Caesar wants his reader to believe that the Roman state is civilizing and freeing Gaul
from the bounds of their slavery by defeating Gallic patrons, as this was his justification for
conquest. In reality, Caesar is justifying stretching the bounds of an empire to suit his own
personal gain. In a close examination of Caesar’s rhetoric of clientela in the BG, the Caesarian
reader is able to see the motivations and characteristics of how Caesar presents himself as the
author. In doing so, we see how Caesar’s political, military, and literary motivations coalesce
through clientela to project his image as Caesar the Conqueror.
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